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Computing a Strategic Decarbonization Pathway: A Chance-Constrained Equilibrium Problem
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DOI：10.1109/TPWRS.2020.3038840.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
US transmission systems and wholesale electricity markets, albeit federally regulated, often span across multiple state jurisdictions. In this environment, state regulators can strategically exploit this techno-economic coupling to advance their clean energy policy goals at the expense of neighboring jurisdictions. This paper investigates strategic regulatory competition to understand its effect on achieving Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We formulate a chance-constrained equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (CC-EPEC), which considers multiple state regulators, acting in coordination with in-state power companies, to implement RPS goals in the least-cost manner. To solve this CC-EPEC, we customize a Progressive Hedging (PH) algorithm. The case study uses the CC-EPEC and PH algorithm to analyze the effects of state regulatory competition in the ISO New England system.
Keywords:
Generators
Regulators
Standards
Electricity supply industry
Planning
Uncertainty
Stochastic processes
Decarbonization
equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints
progressive hedging
regulatory competition
renewable portfolio standard
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