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Conducting dyadic multiple issue negotiation experiments: Methodological recommendations
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DOI：10.1023/A:1008793819872.png)
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Abstract
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We take a critical, yet constructive look at the literature that focuses on multiple issue negotiation experiments. Our purpose is to offer suggestions for improvement when conducting such experiments. We focus on experiments, which are conducted using an externally imposed value point structure for the negotiators across issues together with background context information. Negotiator performance in such experiments is generally poor in the sense that Pareto inferior settlements are typically generated. A possible explanation is that negotiators sometimes follow the externally imposed value points and sometimes their own values pertaining to the context. Hence we conclude that it would be better if multiple issue negotiation experiments would not be based on an apriori given value point structure - unless we have compelling reasons for it - particularly if no agents are used. The common argument against doing this is that we cannot then identify Pareto optimal or Pareto preferred settlements for the subjects. Recent research integrating the fields of Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) together with negotiation analysis, however, provides a possible solution to this problem. An experiment conducted by the authors is used to illustrate our methodological recommendations.
Keywords:
multiple issues
negotiation
Pareto optimality
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