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Conservation auctions: An online double constraint reverse auction experiment
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DOI：10.1093/erae/jbag002.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Conservation auctions are designed to allocate payments for environmental services to voluntary farmers. The auctioneer may announce either the maximum number of contracts (target-constrained auction) or, more commonly, the total budget available (budget-constrained auction). Building on previous work that compared these two formats, we introduce a new double-constraint auction, where both constraints-set at the same levels as in the benchmarks-are simultaneously disclosed to participants. Using the same experimental methodology, we assess performance consistent with a generic policy objective: maximizing environmental benefits while minimizing expenditures. On average, the double-constraint auction outperforms both target- and budget-constrained formats.
Keywords:
reverse auctions
conservation auctions
payment for environmental services
double constraint
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