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Consumption commitments and employment contracts

delete2008-04-01
delete26
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OA
AI
A
Andrew Postlewaite *
L
Larry Samuelson
D
Dan Silverman
DOI:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00472.xdelete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We examine an economy in which the cost of consuming some goods can be reduced by making commitments that reduce flexibility. We show that such consumption commitments can induce consumers with risk-neutral underlying utility functions to be risk averse over small variations in income, but sometimes to seek risk over large variations. As a result, optimal employment contracts will smooth wages conditional on being employed, but may incorporate a possibility of unemployment.
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Review of Economic Studies cover
Review of Economic Studies
IF:
6.4
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2.5K
Citations:
2.1W

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Yale University
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university of pennsylvania
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University of Wisconsin System cover
University of Wisconsin System
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