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CONTENTIOUS CONTENTS - FOR INDUCTIVE PROBABILITY
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DOI：10.1093/bjps/45.1.193.png)
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Abstract
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According to Popper and Miller [1983 and 1987], the part of a hypothesis that transcends the evidence is probabilistically countersupported by the evidence. Therefore, inductive support is not probabilistic support. Their argument hinges on imposing the following necessary condition on 'the part of a hypothesis h that goes beyond the evidence e': that transcendent part, called k, must share no nontrivial consequences with e. I propose a new condition on k that is incompatible with Popper and Miller's condition. I then show why the new condition is a viable alternative to Popper and Miller's. By doing so, I refute their argument that probabilistic support cannot be inductive.
Keywords:
SUPPORT
IMPOSSIBILITY
ARGUMENT
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