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Contests With Delegation
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DOI：10.1111/jpet.70091.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
This paper studies winner-takes-all Tullock contests between two groups, each formed by a principal and a delegate. Principals allocate the monetary prize within their group, while delegates exert effort to win it. In equilibrium, the more productive delegate receives a smaller prize share while enjoying a higher expected payoff. Nevertheless, delegates' expected payoffs do not monotonically increase with their productivity. As productivity differences get wide enough, delegates' expected payoffs decline and tend to zero. Finally, a more balanced competition raises both delegates' efforts and prize shares, ultimately benefiting delegates' utilitarian welfare.
Keywords:
RENT-SEEKING
Journal
J
IF:
0.9
Papers:
54
Citations:
0