.png){kind=icon}
Return
Corruption in Customs*
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1093/qje/qjac032.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
This article presents a new methodology to detect corruption in customs and applies it to Madagascar's main port. Manipulation of assignment of import declarations to inspectors is identified by measuring deviations from random assignment prescribed by official rules. Deviant declarations are more at risk of tax evasion, yet less likely to be deemed fraudulent by inspectors, who also clear them faster. An intervention in which inspector assignment was delegated to a third party validates our approach, but also triggered a novel manifestation of manipulation that rejuvenated systemic corruption. Tax revenue losses associated with the corruption scheme are approximately 3% of total taxes collected and are highly concentrated among a select few inspectors and brokers.
Keywords:
TRADE
EVASION
GAINS
COSTS
Journal
IF:
12.7
Papers:
1.2K
Citations:
4.1W
Organization
Cited Papers
ShareSaveShareSaveExposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes
OAAI
OAAIShareSaveMaking Moves Matter: Experimental Evidence on Incentivizing Bureaucrats through Performance-Based Postings.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWOAAI
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
OAAIShareSaveShareSave
View more