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Decentralization cost in scheduling: A game-theoretic approach

delete2007-07-01
delete23
PRE
AI
Y
Yossi Bukchin *
E
Eran Hanany
DOI：10.1287/msom.1070.0152delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Decentralized organizations may incur inefficiencies because of scheduling issues associated with competition among decision makers (DMs) for limited resources. We analyze the decentralization cost (DC), i.e., the ratio between the Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. Solution properties of a dispatching-sequencing model are derived and subsequently used to develop bounds on the DC for an arbitrary number of jobs and DMs. A scheduling-based coordinating mechanism is then provided, ensuring that the centralized solution is obtained at equilibrium.
Keywords:
game theory
scheduling
decentralization
noncooperative games
incentives
contracting
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Journal

Manufacturing and Service Operations Management cover
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management
IF:
4.2
Papers:
393
Citations:
7.1K

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No organization information available