.png){kind=icon}
Return
Decoding Corruption Cycles: Extractive versus Collusive Corruption
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1007/s11109-026-10206-y.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
A large body of empirical literature shows that politicians’ time horizons influence the level of corruption they engage in. However, some studies suggest that corruption follows a U-shaped pattern across a politician’s tenure, decreasing in the middle and rising again toward the end, while others find an inverse U-shape. We argue that these conflicting findings can be explained by distinguishing between two types of corruption based on whether the corrupt act is one-sided (extraction) or mutually beneficial (collusion). To test this hypothesis, we analyze provincial governors in Vietnam, leveraging 15 years of nationally representative firm-level data and biographical information on local leaders. Our findings provide strong support for a relationship between political tenure and extractive corruption, which follows a clear inverse U-shaped pattern. In contrast, we find little evidence of a systematic pattern in collusive corruption. This contrast underscores that while timing is a crucial determinant of corruption, its impact varies systematically with the nature of the corrupt act.
Keywords:
Corruption
Political horizons
Authoritarianism
Vietnam
Journal
IF:
3.3
Papers:
1.3K
Citations:
5.1K
Organization
Cited Papers
.png){kind=icon}
ShareSave
Political dynasties, term limits and female political representation: Evidence from the Philippines
OAAI
OAAIShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSave
View more