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Digital Collateral

delete2024-01-24
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PRE
AI
P
Paul Gertler *
B
Brett Green
C
Catherine Wolfram
DOI:10.1093/qje/qjae003delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
A new form of secured lending using digital collateral has recently emerged, most prominently in low- and middle-income countries. Digital collateral relies on lockout technology, which allows the lender to temporarily disable the flow value of the collateral to the borrower without physically repossessing it. We explore this new form of credit in a model and a field experiment using school-fee loans digitally secured with a solar home system. Securing a loan with digital collateral drastically reduced default rates (by 19 percentage points) and increased the lender's rate of return (by 49 percentage points). Using a variant of the methodology, we decompose the total effect on repayment and find that roughly two-thirds is attributable to moral hazard, and one-third to adverse selection. In addition, access to digitally secured school-fee loans significantly increased school enrollment and school-related expenditures without detrimental effects on households' balance sheets.
Keywords:
FREE PRIMARY-EDUCATION
CREDIT MARKETS
MORAL HAZARD
CONTRACTS
DEBT
EQUILIBRIA
DEFAULT
ACCESS
POLICY

Journal

Quarterly Journal of Economics cover
Quarterly Journal of Economics
IF:
12.7
Papers:
1.2K
Citations:
4.1W

Organization

University of California System cover
University of California System
Scholars:
37.5W
Papers: 33.7W
Citations: 6.6K
W
washington university (wustl)
Scholars:
5.5W
Papers: 4.5W
Citations: 70
N
National Bureau of Economic Research
Scholars:
2.0K
Papers: 2.4K
Citations: 1.1W
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