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Disclosure Bunching
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PRE
AI
DOI：10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00375.x.png)
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Abstract
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This paper studies managers' preferences among information acquisition and disclosure policies when their firms are required to engage in real-time or continuous financial reporting. The paper predicts that for many, but not all, processes describing the distribution of their firms' cash flows, when subject to such reporting requirements, managers will engage in disclosure bunching, that is, they will bunch the discretionary component of the information they acquire and disclose into a single point in time rather than spread the acquisition and disclosure of that information over time. We show that managers' preferred bunching period depends on managers' strategy for trading in their firms' shares, managers' risk aversion, the risk premium the capital market attaches to firms' shares, and the size of managers' initial ownership stakes in their firms. We also study and characterize how the equilibrium prices of firms' shares vary over time and also how managers' optimal trading strategies vary with their most preferred bunching strategies. Several extensions confirm the robustness of the optimality of disclosure bunching..
Keywords:
STOCK OPTION AWARDS
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURES
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