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Disclosure Incentives for Firms in Light of Cross-Ownership
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DOI：10.2308/TAR-2025-0486.png)
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Abstract
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We model two competing firms, each operating through their controlled subsidiaries while also holding a minority financial stake in their rival's subsidiary. Under such cross-ownership, we derive the firms' optimal disclosure policies, showing how they are affected by technological spillovers, competitive intensity, and the nature of product markets. The results demonstrate that cross-ownership induces more disclosures, benefiting the firm because disclosures promote the profit of its subsidiary (at low spillover values) or the rival's subsidiary (at high spillover values). The increased transparency under cross-ownership can generate Pareto gains, improving consumer surplus and firm profits relative to separate ownership. This unifying finding holds under quantity and price competition, challenging the view that cross-ownership leads firms to collude, harming consumers. Additionally, with cross-ownership, high-spillover disclosures occur more under price than quantity competition. Thus, price competition can generate Pareto gains, contradicting the view that it favors consumers at the expense of firms.
Keywords:
cross-ownership
competition
disclosure
spillovers
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