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Disentangling contract and law: Legal specificity and contractual governance in public–private partnerships
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DOI：10.1002/smj.70111.png)
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Abstract
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This study examines how legal design shapes contractual governance in public–private partnership (PPP). We argue that PPP-specific laws do not simply strengthen institutional safeguards; by varying in detail, they also alter the flexibility available for project-level contracting. Highly specific laws better constrain governmental discretion but raise adaptation costs, making user-pay contracts, where private partners bear demand risk and rely on market-responsive adjustment, less attractive. Less specific laws preserve greater contractual discretion and are therefore associated with more user-pay arrangements. We also show that countries with weaker political constraints adopt more specific PPP laws, suggesting that legal design compensates for weaker institutional checks. Using 3986 PPP projects in 53 countries from 1997 to 2021, we find support for these claims.
Keywords:
contractual governance
demand risk
institutional constraints
legal specificity
public–private partnerships
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