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Do Director Elections Matter?
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DOI：10.1093/rfs/hhx078.png)
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Abstract
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Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001-2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections called Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is. A series of tests, including one that exploits variation in Years-to-election that comes from other boards, supports a causal interpretation. Further analyses show that other governance mechanisms do not drive the relation between board Years-to-election and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We conclude that director elections have important implications for corporate governance.
Keywords:
CEO TURNOVER
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER
BOARD COMPOSITION
FIRM PERFORMANCE
STAGGERED BOARDS
PROXY CONTESTS
MARKET
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