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Do Managerial Traits Matter in Corporate Lobbying? Evidence from Overconfident CEOs
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DOI:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2026.107704.png)
Abstract
En 中文
• Firms led by overconfident CEOs engage in a lower level of lobbying expenditure. • The negative association is more pronounced when facing heightened political risks. • Overconfident CEOs place excessive reliance on their own abilities and do not view lobbying as a risk-reducing mechanism.
Keywords:
CEO overconfidence
corporate political activities
corporate lobbying
political risk
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IF:
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65
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