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Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?
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DOI：10.1093/ej/ueaf082.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? To investigate this question, we focus on a policy that has been widely used across the world: anti-corruption audits. We examine the impact of Brazil's prominent audit programme on clientelism using a novel survey of rural citizens. Randomised audits reduce politicians' provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens' demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. We investigate mechanisms by which audits may reduce clientelism, and find that audits significantly reduce citizens' willingness to supply clientelistic votes.
Keywords:
MACHINE POLITICS
FIELD EXPERIMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY
PERSPECTIVES
INCENTIVES
BRIBES
BRAZIL
AUDITS
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