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Does competition kill corruption?
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DOI：10.1086/262102.png)
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Abstract
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Corrupt agents (officials or gangsters) exact money from firms. Corruption affects the number of firms in a free-entry equilibrium. The degree of deep competition in the economy increases with lower overhead costs relative to profits and with a tendency toward similar cost structures. Increases in competition may not lower corruption. The model explains why a rational corrupt agent may extinguish the source of his bribe income by causing a firm to exit. Assessing the welfare effect of corruption is complicated by the fact that exit caused by corruption does not necessarily reduce social welfare.
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