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Does digital surveillance boost citizen compliance? Evidence from China
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DOI：10.1111/pops.70170.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Authoritarian regimes increasingly deploy digital surveillance to monitor citizens, but how this affects citizen compliance remains understudied. We argue that, beyond repressing or deterring regime opponents, digital surveillance serves as an instrument of everyday governance that operates through psychological mechanisms rather than direct coercion. Specifically, pervasive monitoring fosters routine compliance with the regime through self-regulation and mutual observation. However, these effects attenuate over time as citizens habituate to surveillance and update risk assessments about noncompliance. We test this argument against empirical evidence from China. Drawing on in-depth fieldwork and employing a quasi-natural experiment enabled by two pilot surveillance projects that coincided with two national social surveys, we reveal digital surveillance's paradoxical short- and long-term effects: Newly introduced surveillance significantly boosts citizen compliance. Over time, however, this effect diminishes, and even reinforced surveillance cannot sustain the initial surge in compliance. The findings highlight both the potency and the limits of digital surveillance as a tool of authoritarian governance.
Keywords:
authoritarian control
China
citizen compliance
digital surveillance
mixed research methods
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