.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Dynamic contest model with bounded rationality
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.amc.2019.124909.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
This paper is devoted to exploring the complex dynamics of contest model, where two agents compete for some object with asymmetric valuations by simultaneously choosing efforts at each step. We build the nonlinear discrete system to describe the dynamic contest with bounded rationality, and discuss the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium theoretically. Meanwhile, our numerical simulation experiments also reveal that the model can exhibit very complex dynamical behaviors. In particular, there exist two different routes to chaos for the system: the period-doubling (flip) bifurcation which leads to periodic cycles and chaos, and the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation which derives an attractive invariant closed curve. These two routes are significantly different for economic views. In addition, the stability of Nash equilibrium point is badly affected by the system parameters, such as the adjustment speeds, the values of the object, and so on. Therefore, the parameter adjustment method could be properly applied to make the system return to its stable state. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Contest
Bounded rationality
Stability
Flip bifurcation
Neimark-Sacker bifurcation
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
3.4
Papers:
2.3W
Citations:
3.3W