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Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility
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DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.006.png)
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Abstract
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We study a firm's internal resource allocation using a dynamic principal-agent model with endogenous cash flow volatility. The principal supplies the agent with resources for productive use, but the agent has private control over both project volatility and resource intensity and may misallocate resources to obtain private benefits. The optimal contract can yield either overly risky or overly prudent project selection. It can be implemented with a constant pricing schedule (i.e., a static, decentralized, linear mechanism), giving the agent control over the resource quantities, project risk, and agent's equity share. The implementation rationalizes the use of hurdle rates above a firm's cost of capital and transfer prices above marginal cost, while showing that hurdle rates or transfer prices may not vary with the agent's risk choice. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords:
Capital budgeting
Transfer pricing
Dynamic contracting
Volatility control
Cost of capital
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