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Dynamical Failures Driven by False Load Injection Attacks Against Smart Grid
DOI:10.1109/TIFS.2022.3181860.png)
Abstract
En 中文
Extensive studies have revealed that smart grid is vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks. However, these strategies only focus on the cascading initiation phase to induce single-stage failures with multiple branch tripping, lacking of exploring the attack effectiveness in the propagation phase so that the deeply-hidden cascading failures are underestimated. In this paper, we propose a novel false load injection attack strategy that can intentionally penetrate into the cascading propagation phase to drive multi-stage dynamical failures with a cascading process. Specifically, we formulate a bi-level optimization problem to model the adversarial game between operator and attacker. The former is in charge of security-constrained economic dispatching to minimize the generation cost, and the latter aims to maximize the cumulative number of tripped branches. Further, we reformulate this NP-hard bi-level problem as a mixed integer linear program for tractable computation. Finally, we perform numerical simulations on different-scale IEEE test systems to validate our strategy in driving the dynamical failures.
Keywords:
Power system protection
Power system faults
Smart grids
State estimation
Security
Meters
Phase measurement
Bi-level optimization
cascading failures
cyber-physical attack
smart grid security
Journal
IF:
8
Papers:
5.2K
Citations:
2.3W

