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EFFICIENCY VERSUS EQUALITY IN BARGAINING
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DOI：10.1093/jeea/jvy030.png)
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Abstract
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We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.
Keywords:
FOCAL POINTS
INEQUALITY AVERSION
SOCIAL PREFERENCES
INFORMATION
UNCERTAINTY
GAMES
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