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Efficient learning equilibrium
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DOI：10.1016/j.artint.2004.04.013.png)
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Abstract
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We introduce efficient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to learning in noncooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms must arrive at a desired value after polynomial time, and a deviation from the prescribed ELE becomes irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE (where the desired value is the expected payoff in a Nash equilibrium) and of a Pareto-ELE (where the objective is the maximization of social surplus) in repeated games with perfect monitoring. We also show that an ELE does not always exist in the imperfect monitoring case. Finally, we discuss the extension of these results to general-sum stochastic games. (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords:
learning equilibrium
Ex-post equilibrium
efficiency
multi-agent learning
repeated games
stochastic games
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