.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Enforcement missions: Targets vs budgets
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.005.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement program be given? When there is more than one firm being regulated the firms' decision problems-otherwise completely separate-become linked in a way that depends on that mission. Under some sorts of missions firms compete to avoid the attention of the enforcer by competitive reductions in the extent of their noncompliance, in others the interaction encourages competitive expansions. We develop a general model that allows for the ordering of some typical classes of missions. We find that in plausible settings 'target-driven' missions (that set a hard target in terms of environmental outcome but flexible budget) achieve the same outcome at lower cost than 'budget-driven' ones (that fix the enforcement budget). Inspection of some fixed fraction of firms is never optimal. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Enforcement
Regulatory missions
Policy delegation
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
5.9
Papers:
2.6K
Citations:
1.2W