.png){kind=icon}
Return
Evaluating Strategic Forecasters
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1257/aer.20170299.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Motivated by the question of how one should evaluate professional election forecasters, we study a novel dynamic mechanism design problem without transfers. A principal who wishes to hire only high-quality forecasters is faced with an agent of unknown quality. The agent privately observes signals about a publicly observable future event, and may strategically misrepresent information to inflate the principal's perception of his quality. We show that the optimal deterministic mechanism is simple and easy to implement in practice: it evaluates a single, optimally timed prediction. We study the generality of this result and its robustness to randomization and noncommitment.
Keywords:
CHEAP-TALK
EXPERTS
INFORMATION
DESIGN
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
11.6
Papers:
5.0K
Citations:
7.5W
Organization
Cited Papers
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveThe republicans should pray for rain: Weather, turnout, and voting in US Presidential elections.png)
JOURNAL OF POLITICS
JOURNAL OF POLITICSIF3.8
PREAI
ShareSaveShareSaveShareSaveShareSave
View more