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EVCS siting and sizing with multi-stakeholder utilities: non-cooperative and cooperative perspectives
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DOI：10.1016/j.tra.2026.105172.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
To alleviate the imbalance between the construction and utilization of charging infrastructure, this study develops an integrated framework that couples a non-cooperative perspective, a cooperative perspective, and charging demand generation to analyze the siting and sizing outcomes of electric vehicle charging stations (EVCS) among operators, users, and the grid. First, utility functions for the stakeholders and a Nash-product-inspired multi-stakeholder optimization model are formulated from a non-cooperative perspective. Second, a Shapley-value-based imposed utility-transfer mechanism is introduced to extend the model to a cooperative perspective. Third, a Monte Carlo-based charging demand generation method is proposed, which infers the evolution of vehicle state of charge (SoC) using a vehicle energy-consumption model. Finally, the SoC data is used as input, and a genetic algorithm with an elitist strategy is used to solve the problem. Experiments on Hangzhou datasets show that, under the baseline utility-coupling setting, although EVCS siting and sizing can improve utility, they are still accompanied by investment contraction and insufficient accessibility, and stakeholder participation incentives may remain unstable. Meanwhile, user heterogeneity highlights the demand for a higher-quality charging environment. Although expanding the service radius and improving charging capability can enhance utility, the associated marginal gains exhibit a diminishing trend. By contrast, the imposed utility-transfer mechanism can be introduced at an early stage of planning, where it coordinates the utility allocation among the stakeholders, promotes infrastructure deployment, and thereby improves overall system sustainability.
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