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EVOLUTIONARY SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES
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DOI：10.2307/2171774.png)
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Abstract
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This paper investigates stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games. The analysis is focused on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed-strategy space. The main result is a characterization of those faces which are asymptotically stable in all dynamics from a certain class, and we show that every such face contains an essential component of the set of Nash equilibria, and hence a strategically stable set in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).
Keywords:
DYNAMICS
EVOLUTION
NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES
STABILITY
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