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EXIT FROM CONTRACT
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OA
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DOI：10.1093/jla/lau003.png)
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Abstract
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Exit from contract is one of the most powerful consumer protection devices, freeing consumers from bad deals and keeping businesses honest. Yet consumers often choose transactions with lock-in provisions, trading off exit rights for other perks. This article examines the costs and benefits of free exit, as compared to the lock-in alternative. It argues that present regulation of exit penalties is poorly tailored to address concerns about lock-in, particularly in light of increasingly ubiquitous market-based solutions. The article also calls (regulatory) attention to loyalty rewards, which are shown to be as powerful as exit penalties, and equally detrimental.
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IF:
1.8
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112
Citations:
437
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Cited Papers
Molecular identification of Leishmania in free-ranging black and gold howler monkeys (Alouatta caraya) in northeastern Argentina.png)
Acta Tropica
Acta TropicaIF0
PREAI
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