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Expert-Captured Democracies

delete2020-06-01
delete7
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OA
AI
A
Archishman Chakraborty *
P
Parikshit Ghosh
J
Jaideep Roy
DOI:10.1257/aer.20181396delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert's interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit that makes indirect democracy superior to direct democracy and office-seeking parties better than those motivated by public interest. But voter welfare is highest when an expert captured technocratic party competes against an uninformed populist one.
Keywords:
CHEAP-TALK
POLITICAL COMPETITION
INFORMATION
MODEL
CANDIDATE
REPRESENTATION
CHARACTER
NEWS
AI Summary

AI Summary

Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.

Journal

American Economic Review cover
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
Papers:
5.0K
Citations:
7.5W

Organization

Y
Yeshiva University
Scholars:
1.7W
Papers: 1.3W
Citations: 2.7K
U
university of delhi
Scholars:
1.2W
Papers: 9.7K
Citations: 3
D
delhi school of economics
Scholars:
130
Papers: 126
Citations: 1
researcher View more organizations
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

Signaling character in electoral competition
err2007-05-01
err154
PREAI
errKartik, Navin; McAfee, R. Preston
errShare
errSave
Informative Cheap Talk in Elections
err2018-01-30
err18
PREAI
errKartik, Navin; Van Weelden, Richard
errShare
errSave
researcher View more