.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
False Data Injection Attack and Defense Method on Load Frequency Control
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1109/JIOT.2020.3021429.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
The load frequency control (LFC) system is an essential component of the smart grid and is located between cyberspace information and the physical infrastructure. Because the operation of LFC depends on the modern network communication technology, it is vulnerable to network attacks. The false data injection attack (FDIA) injects attack data into the data collected by the LFC system, affecting the control center's calculation and causing errors in the control signals, which affects the stable operation of the power system. For the LFC system, this article builds a cyber-physical model. Based on the model, an FDIA detection and defense mechanism based on the GAN network is proposed. By calculating, contrasting, and replacing the control signals, the proposed method can detect and defend against FDIAs. The experimental results on the two-area interconnected power system, the IEEE 39-bus, and IEEE 118-bus power system show that the proposed defense method can ensure the power system frequency and tie-line power deviation remain within the set value when suffered from FDIA.
Keywords:
Generators
Data models
Automatic generation control
Automatic frequency control
Smart grids
Attack detection and defense
cyber– physical model
false data injection attack (FDIA)
load frequency control (LFC)
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
8.9
Papers:
1.4W
Citations:
7.8W