Return
Forward guidance: Communication, commitment, or both?
DOI:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2019.08.015.png)
Abstract
En 中文
Forward guidance has been suggested as a form of commitment (Odyssean) by the policymaker or as a way of conveying information (Delphic). I analyze the interaction between households and the central bank as a game in which the central bank sends messages. Without private information, the set of equilibrium payoffs is independent of any announcements: Pure Odyssean forward guidance is redundant. With private information, communication can have social value. Forward guidance is well suited to leverage preexisting credibility to communicate a central bank's private information about its own preferences or beliefs. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Cheap talk
Credibility
Odyssean
Delphic
Central bank
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
4.1
Papers:
3.2K
Citations:
1.1W

