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Good Governance: A Fiduciary Model
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DOI：10.1086/730736.png)
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Abstract
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Is there an ideal for how government agents, specifically those within the executive branch, should exercise public power? Over the last 40 years, development practitioners, political scientists, economists, public administrators, and public lawyers have sought to define such an ideal qua good governance. Yet despite these normative ambitions, few political philosophers have been party to the debate. This article aims to redress such neglect. It distils four primary models of good governance. It ultimately argues for the fiduciary model. Prima facie, this model seems implausible: it entails that we all have reason to promote, realize, and respect a government of agents who, when left with discretion, have a duty to conform to their own conceptions of the public interest, even if false. This article, however, leverages the fact that such agents personate the public to argue that the model is necessary to avoid the classical pathology of despotism.
Keywords:
good governance
good government
fiduciary governance
public trust
despotism
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