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Group size as selection device
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DOI：10.1007/s00199-026-01714-3.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.
Keywords:
Poisson games
Coordination games
Equilibrium selection
Global games
C72
D82
Journal
E
IF:
1.1
Papers:
37
Citations:
0
Organization
Cited Papers
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