arrow
Return

Growing Platforms by Adding Complementors Without a Contract

delete2025-02-20
delete0
PRE
AI
R
Raveesh Mayya *
栗
栗卓新 (Zhuoxin Li)
DOI:10.1287/isre.2023.0237delete
deleteOriginal
deleteOriginal request for help
deleteShare
deleteSave
Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Multisided platforms often pursue growth strategies of expanding participants on one side (e.g., suppliers) and leveraging the cross-side network effect to attract participants on other sides (e.g., consumers). Whereas formal contractual agreements have traditionally been the norm for onboarding suppliers, an emerging trend involves platforms enabling consumers to interact with noncontracted suppliers via third-party enablers with both sharing profits from providing complementary services. This study examines this strategy of increasing market thickness in the context of food delivery platforms, focusing on the platforms' inclusion of restaurants as nonpartnered restaurants. Nonpartnered restaurants do not pay commission fees for being listed on the platforms and do not control their menu or item prices. The platforms collect and transfer consumer orders to the thirdparty deliverers who place the order, pick it up, and deliver the food to consumers. The strategy has drawn regulatory scrutiny regarding its potential harm to nonpartnered restaurants and consumers. This research empirically investigates the impact of this noncontracted partnership on restaurants, leveraging two natural experiments: (1) a number of nonpartnered restaurants were listed on the platform, and (2) the restaurants were later delisted because of a governmental regulation. Our findings show that being added as a nonpartnered restaurant increases these restaurants' revenue from takeout orders by about $1,410 per month. Adding nonpartnered restaurants also has a positive spillover effect on the revenue of partnered restaurants already on the platform. Finally, the delisting of nonpartnered restaurants leads to a drop in their takeout orders as well as a negative spillover on the revenue of partnered restaurants. In essence, a nonpartnered contract benefits most restaurants, especially independent restaurants. These insights can inform the design of platform and regulatory policies related to noncontracted growth strategies.
Keywords:
multisided platform
market thickness
on-demand delivery
network effects
regulation
seeding
platform policy

Journal

Information Systems Research cover
Information Systems Research
IF:
5.1
Papers:
1.4K
Citations:
1.4W

Organization

N
New York University
Scholars:
4.4W
Papers: 3.9W
Citations: 5.8W
University of Wisconsin System cover
University of Wisconsin System
Scholars:
6.7W
Papers: 5.8W
Citations: 382
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

Ca2+ entry blockers inhibit prostaglandin F2+-induced cerebrovascular contractile responses In goats
err1991-10-01
err0
PREAI
errJuan B. Salom; Germán Torregrosa; Francisco J. Miranda; JoséA. Alabadí; Cristina Alvarez; Enrique Alborch
errShare
errSave
WHO FORGOES SCREENING IN ONLINE MARKETS AND WHY? EVIDENCE FROM AIRBNB
err2021-10-14
err18
PREAI
errMayya, Raveesh; Ye, Shun; Viswanathan, Siva; Agarwal, Rajshree
errShare
errSave
errShare
errSave
errShare
errSave
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF EPIDEMIC KERATOCONJUNCTIVITIS
err1987-01-01
err0
PREAI
errEARL FORD; KENRAD E. NELSON; DORA WARREN
errShare
errSave
China’s Economic Development
err
IF0
err2019-03-13
err0
PREAI
errChu-yuan Cheng
errShare
errSave
researcher View more