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Growth LBOs

delete2011-11-01
delete130
PRE
AI
Q
Quentin Boucly
D
David Sraer *
T
Thesmar, David
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.014delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets to take advantage of hitherto unexploited growth opportunities. First, post-buyout growth is concentrated among private-to-private transactions, i.e., deals where the seller is an individual, as opposed to divisional buyouts or public-to-private LBOs where the seller is a private or a public firm. Second, the observed post-buyout growth in size and post-buyout increase in debt and capital expenditures are stronger when the targets operate in an industry that is relatively more dependent on external finance. These results contrast with existing evidence that LBO targets invest less or downsize. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Leveraged buyout
Credit constraints
Private firms
Corporate growth

Journal

Journal of Financial Economics cover
Journal of Financial Economics
IF:
12
Papers:
3.8K
Citations:
5.5W

Organization

P
Princeton University
Scholars:
2.1W
Papers: 2.3W
Citations: 5.1W
H
hautes etudes commerciales (hec) paris
Scholars:
391
Papers: 583
Citations: 2