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Hedging and competition

delete2009-12-01
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PRE
AI
L
Liu, Tingjun *
C
Christine A. Parlour
DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.008delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We consider firms that, all else equal, wish to minimize variability in their internal capital(due to convex costs of raising external funds). The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the auction. We characterize optimal hedging and bidding strategies in this competition framework. We show that access to financial markets makes firms bid more aggressively, possibly even above their valuation for the project. In addition, hedging increases the variance of bids and makes firm values more dispersed. Further, with hedging, the covariance of internal capital changes with the risk factor is negative, and is more negative, the higher the correlation of the hedging instrument with the risk factor. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Hedging
Competition
Auctions
Contingent risk

Journal

Journal of Financial Economics cover
Journal of Financial Economics
IF:
12
Papers:
3.8K
Citations:
5.5W

Organization

A
Arizona State University
Scholars:
2.7W
Papers: 2.5W
Citations: 4.2W
A
arizona state university-tempe
Scholars:
1.5W
Papers: 1.2W
Citations: 13
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

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Hedging and liquidity
err2000-01-01
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PREAI
errMello, AS; Parsons, JE
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