.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
How Often Do Managers Withhold Information?
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.2308/accr-52619.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain, but persistent, information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (1) managers face disclosure frictions 35 percent of the time; (2) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17 percent of the time; and (3) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24 percent of the time. Managers' strategic withholding motives increase investors' uncertainty about earnings by 3 percent. We find that managers' price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third in response to investors' increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure.
Keywords:
voluntary disclosure
management forecasts
information endowment
strategic withholding
structural estimation
disclosure cost
Journal
IF:
4.4
Papers:
2.4K
Citations:
2.0W
