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How passenger satisfaction affects the sustainable development of integrated passenger and freight transport based on public traffic: An evolutionary game approach
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DOI：10.1016/j.rtbm.2026.101656.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
While integrated passenger and freight transport (IPFT) is increasingly viewed as a promising solution to urban congestion and resource underutilization, existing studies have largely focused on operational design, static optimization, or single-stakeholder models. Few studies have examined how dynamic interactions among key actors, particularly in response to changes in passenger satisfaction, shape the long-term viability of IPFT system. To fill this research gap, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, bus operators, and logistics enterprises, with passenger satisfaction as the central behavioral driver. The model captures the strategic adaptation of stakeholders under different policy incentives, compensation mechanisms, and cost-sharing schemes. The results indicate that improved passenger satisfaction under the IPFT model significantly promotes collaboration among the government, bus operators, and logistics enterprises. Appropriate government subsidies and reasonable cost-sharing mechanisms can enhance the willingness of all parties to cooperate and accelerate the system towards a stable equilibrium. Conversely, excessive cost pressure or insufficient incentives may lead to sluggish evolution or even divergence from cooperative outcomes. Therefore, future research and practice should further emphasize the central role of passenger satisfaction in system evolution. By establishing scientifically sound cooperation and incentive mechanisms, a stable collaborative relationship among the three stakeholders can be fostered, thereby supporting the sustainable development of the IPFT system.
Keywords:
Multi-agent cooperative evolution
System stability
Stakeholder strategy
Subsidy-based
Bus coupon
Cost-sharing
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