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How would a monopsony employer hurt labor? A simple dynamic model
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DOI：10.1016/j.econmod.2026.107716.png)
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Abstract
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• Monopsony model reveals incentive-driven unemployment and welfare loss. • To motivate their workforce, these employers threaten not to renew contracts. • Planner allocation improves welfare by raising wages and employment. • Simple numerical examples mimic several empirical stylized facts. • Wage compression emerges endogenously despite large productivity gaps.
Keywords:
code
D30
D40
J42
Excessive inequality
Increasing market concentration
Monopsony power
Productivity difference
Under-pay
Under-employment
Repeated moral hazard
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