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Inconsistent Retirement Timing

delete2022-01-13
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OA
AI
C
Christoph Merkle *
P
Philipp Schreiber
M
Martin Weber
DOI:10.3368/jhr.0920-11215R2delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We study the effect of inconsistent time preferences on actual and planned retirement timing decisions in two independent data sets. Theory predicts that hyperbolic time preferences can lead to dynamically inconsistent retirement timing. In an online experiment with more than 2,000 participants, we find that time-inconsistent participants retire on average 1.75 years earlier than time-consistent participants do. The planned retirement age of nonretired participants decreases with age. This negative age effect is about twice as strong among time-inconsistent participants. The temptation of early retirement seems to rise in the final years of approaching retirement. Consequently, time-inconsistent participants have a higher probability of regretting their retirement decision. We find similar results for a representative household survey (German SAVE panel). Using smoking behavior and overdraft usage as time preference proxies, we confirm that time-inconsistent participants retire earlier and that nonretirees reduce their planned retirement age within the panel.
Keywords:
SUBJECTIVE LIFE EXPECTANCY
INDIVIDUAL DISCOUNT RATES
TIME PREFERENCE
PRESENT BIAS
EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE
CIGARETTE-SMOKING
DELAY
INCENTIVES
HEALTH
AGE

Journal

J
Journal of Human Resources
IF:
6
Papers:
2.8K
Citations:
6.6K

Organization

U
University of Mannheim
Scholars:
1.9K
Papers: 2.2K
Citations: 3.2K
A
Aarhus University
Scholars:
4.3W
Papers: 4.2W
Citations: 4.8W