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Inference, time, and Anscombean practical knowledge
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DOI：10.1080/13869795.2025.2557219.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
According to the Anscombean thesis, when one is doing something intentionally, one must know that one is doing it. Such agential knowledge of what one is doing is often called 'practical knowledge'. According to the inferential account of practical knowledge, practical knowledge is inferred from knowledge of intention. Kieran Setiya famously argues that the inferential account cannot square with the Anscombean thesis. I propose two different readings of his argument and contend that neither of them works. I then present a new argument to demonstrate the incompatibility between the inferential account and the Anscombean thesis by focusing on their temporal aspects.
Keywords:
Intentional action
practical knowledge
intention
G. E. M. Anscombe
philosophy of action
epistemology
Journal
P
IF:
1.1
Papers:
11
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0
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