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Informational size and efficient auctions

delete2004-07-01
delete40
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OA
AI
R
Richard P. McLean *
A
Andrew Postlewaite
DOI：10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00305.xdelete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents' signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders will be arbitrarily small if agents are sufficiently informationally small.
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Journal

Review of Economic Studies cover
Review of Economic Studies
IF:
6.4
Papers:
2.5K
Citations:
2.1W

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No organization information available