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Informationally Simple Incentives
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DOI：10.1086/722089.png)
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Abstract
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We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others'. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others' preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons. First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant-strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, this endogenizes an independent-private-value property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition that rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms.
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