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Informed Information Design
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OA
AI
DOI：10.1086/724843.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim-optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single- and multiagent interactive environments in which ex ante-optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.
Keywords:
PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP
BAYESIAN PERSUASION
CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM
MECHANISM DESIGN
GAMES
THEOREMS
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