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INTERTEMPORAL COMMITMENT PROBLEMS AND VOTING ON REDISTRIBUTIVE TAXATION
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DOI：10.1006/juec.1994.1036.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
A rich person who fears a loss of income may later favor redistributive taxation and a mix of taxes and public goods that differs from the one he now favors. If mobility is costly, and if government in each period uses majority voting to determine policy, then this person may prefer to live in a community that is permanently ruled by poor residents. Majority voting is a mechanism that can overcome intertemporal commitment problems of income insurance. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
Keywords:
INCOME-REDISTRIBUTION
CREDIBILITY
DISCRETION
INSURANCE
POLITICS
MOBILITY
POLICY
RULES
MODEL
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