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Intertemporal trust game
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DOI：10.1108/rbe-11-2024-0256.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
We experimentally investigate the effect of the timing of decision implementation on trust and trustworthiness. In the "today" treatment, a standard trust game is conducted with subjects receiving payments on the date of the experiment. In the "later" treatment, subjects make decisions on the same date as in the today treatment, but the decisions are implemented (and payments executed) one week later. Our findings indicate that both trust and trustworthiness are lower when decisions are implemented with a delay and that the effect of time delay is more pronounced on trustworthiness (reciprocity) than on trusting behavior. The results are consistent with our model and a plausible explanation is that altruistic utility is discounted more heavily than monetary utility.
Keywords:
Time preference
Social norms
Experiment
C72
C91
D64
Journal
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IF:
0.5
Papers:
35
Citations:
0
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
PREAI
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