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Joint liability lending and the peer selection effect
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DOI：10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01029.x.png)
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Abstract
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We show that the joint liability lending contracts derived in Ghatak (2000) violate an ex post incentive-compatibility constraint which says that the amount of joint liability cannot exceed the amount of individual liability. We derive and characterise optimal separating joint liability contracts incorporating this constraint.
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