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Judgment: a cognitive processing perspective
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DOI：10.1002/wcs.1259.png)
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Abstract
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Historically, judgment research has been mainly concerned with identifying regularities in sensation (e.g., discriminability laws) and assessing judgment accuracy. More recently, the focus has shifted toward specifying the information processing mechanisms underlying judgment and modeling them, for example, as cognitive strategies. We contrast this strategy approach with previous prominent research programs on judgment and provide an overview of various process-level accounts that have been proposed in terms of computational models (e.g., compensatory and noncompensatory cue-abstraction strategies, evidence accumulation, exemplar processing, and parallel constraint satisfaction). Importantly, empirical investigations show that the cognitive processes underlying judgment differ considerably as a function of the individual's cognitive capacity and characteristics of the task environment (e.g., information cost, cognitive capacity, cue inter-correlations, relationship between cues and the to-be-judged criterion). We argue that these systematic contingencies in strategy use can be understood as adaptive responses to costs in learning, information acquisition, and strategy execution. (C) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:665-681. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1259 Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest for this article For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Keywords:
TAKE-THE-BEST
MULTIPLE-CUE JUDGMENT
DECISION-MAKING
STRATEGY SELECTION
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
CONJUNCTION FALLACY
SIGNAL-DETECTION
WORKING-MEMORY
MODELS
RECOGNITION
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