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Knowledge and Argument

delete2026-01-01
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P
Paulson, Spencer *
DOI:10.1111/nous.70048delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument. This makes knowledge well-suited to facilitate epistemic social coordination. Since executive-level belief revision works by running offline simulations that check for robustness in the face of counterargument, knowledge plays an explanatory role in executive-level belief revision as well. The self-monitoring system is in effect checking beliefs to make sure they are knowledge and revising them if they are not. It was selected for its ability to facilitate social coordination on the truth in this way. Assigning this explanatory role to knowledge allows us to see its importance while sidestepping major points of contention.
Keywords:
defeasibility
folk psychology
knowledge
metacognition
psychological explanation
social cognition

Journal

N
NOUS
IF:
2
Papers:
31
Citations:
1

Organization

U
University of Vienna
Scholars:
1.5K
Papers: 617
Citations: 1.4W
Cited Papers

Cited Papers

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Image And Brain
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err1994-01-01
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PREAI
errStephen M. Kosslyn
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Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief
err1969-04-24
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PREAI
errKeith Lehrer; Thomas Paxson
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PREAI
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PREAI
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Knowledge, truth and evidence
err1965-04-01
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PREAI
errK. Lehrer
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The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
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err2009-08-14
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PREAI
errJonathan L. Kvanvig
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