.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Large Games: Robustness and Stability
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1146/annurev-economics-072720-042303.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
This review focuses on properties related to the robustness and stability of Nash equilibria in games with a large number of players. Somewhat surprisingly, these equilibria become substantially more robust and stable as the number of players increases. We illustrate the relevant phenomena through a binary-action game with strategic substitutes, framed as a game of social isolation in a pandemic environment.
Keywords:
large games
Nash equilibrium
ex-post Nash
structural robustness
fault tolerance
viability